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In 2007, in “Philosophy East and West” (Vol. 57, Issue 4), Zhinhua Yao published the article 
Four-dimensional Time in Dzogchen and Heidegger. The main purpose of Zhinhua Yao’s text 
was to discuss the similarities and differences between the four-dimensional time theories 
as found in these two different traditions of thought and inquire into the possible sources of 
their striking similarities. Zhinhua Yao’s text ends with his careful tentative conclusion: “Both 
Longchenpa and Heidegger go beyond the conventional understanding of time by examining 
carefully the experience of passage of time. In such an experience, a fourth time or dimension 
of time manifests itself to be presence or presencing.”  Finally, he states that this coincidence 
has a source in the fundamental fourfoldness inherent in the human mind, a fourfoldness 
which also works in the process of its temporalization.
My paper is an attempt to examine some other possibilities of understanding the ques-
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Yao’s conclusions.
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TIME AND METAPHYSICS
It is beyond question that exploring the nature of time is one of the most diffi-
cult matters for human thinking, however it also seems obvious that the under-
standing of time must be a fortiori bound with some accepted understanding 
of reality and subjectivity. Therefore, any thinking of time, temporality, and 
four-dimensional time requires careful reflection on that relation and a precise 
clarification of the fundamental concept of reality and time, both in Dzogchen 
and in Heidegger (1889–1976). Only then will it be possible to reach any real 
meaning of the expression “four-dimensional time”.
I suggest we start with the following introductory, and probably important, 
remark about Zhinhua Yao’s interpretation: he does not seem to understand, or 
at least chooses to ignore, one basic fact about Heidegger’s thought. Following 
Husserl, who in his early phenomenology formulated the idea of the destruc-
tion of metaphysics, Heidegger in Being and Time already tried to carry it out, 
starting, however, from a different position. In § 6. of Being and Time we read 
that “taking the question of Being as our clue we are to destroy the traditional 
content of the traditional ontology until we arrive at those primordial experi-
ences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being 
– the ways which have guided us ever since.”1 Überwindug der Metaphysik 
(Overcoming of Metaphysics) is one of Heidegger’s guiding ideas, which will 
be further radicalised by him along his path of thinking. Zhinhua Yao, however, 
states: “Among Western philosophers, Heidegger is one of the few who treats 
time seriously and brings it within the scope of metaphysics” and a little later 
“Heidegger starts metaphysical questioning of being with human existence.”2
Such an understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy seems to have vital con-
sequences for Zhinhua Yao’s line of reasoning, because it makes it difficult 
for him to identify the key problem indicated by Derrida in his commentary 
on Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. As Derrida used to say, time as the name for 
the rule of presence constitutes a part of metaphysics and belongs to its vo-
cabulary. According to him, there is no possibility of another notion of time, 
because there is no escape from metaphysics at all. However, this is exactly 
what Heidegger set out to do in Being and Time. Therefore Derrida says that 
a common concept of time is without alternative, because ‘an other concept 
of time cannot be opposed to it, since time in general belongs to metaphysical 
conceptuality. In attempting to produce this other concept, one rapidly would 
1 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Oxford 1990, p. 44.
2 Yao Zhinhua, op. cit., p. 520.
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come to see that it is constructed out of other metaphysical or ontotheological 
predicates. Was this not Heidegger’s experience in Being and Time?’3
We find a similar problem in Buddhism, or in Dzogchen to be more pre-
cise. After Nāgārjuna’s deconstruction of time in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 
how is it possible at all that Longchenpa (Klong-chen rab’byams pa, 1308–
1363) still ponders the question of time and thinks about the four-dimensional 
time despite Nagarjuna’s negative verdict on time itself, despite his view on 
the illusionary nature of time?
So we have to deal with a set of very fundamental questions which seems 
to be absent from Zhinhua Yao considerations. If time is something which is 
actually included within metaphysics and this very metaphysics determines 
time as the name for presence, how is it possible that after the deconstruction 
or smashing of the possibility of any substance we can still use the notion of 
time? If it is the case, can we use it in another meaning somehow? It seems 
that we deal here probably with two options: firstly, it is reasonable to talk 
about time only via its relation to metaphysics, only within the scope of it, and 
not beyond it as Nāgārjuna and Derrida suggest? Secondly, it will be possible 
to extend thinking on time beyond the scope of metaphysics, as proposed by 
Longchenpa and Heidegger. We should, however, ask a fortiori about the dif-
ference and relation between these two usages of the notion of time, also about 
the possibility, basis for, and the meaning of, this second usage of the notion 
of time which already lies beyond the realm of metaphysics, which somehow 
culminates in the term four-dimensional time. Briefly put: this second option 
means that it will be somehow possible to conceive time beyond metaphysics 
while additionally opening up the possibility that the source of time lies out-
side realm of metaphysics.
TIME BEYOND METAPHYSICS
It seems that both Longchenpa and Heidegger try to explore that second option 
in understanding the nature of time. If so, the first and metaphysical one, the 
so-called common notion of time, should already be somehow transcended. 
This automatically means that understanding time as a kind a flow of moments 
from the past to the future, an understanding based on metaphysical notions 
of being, presence, relations, cause and effect, etc., should be transcended. 
3 J. Derrida, Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time, [in:] J. Derrida, 
Margins of Philosophy, trans. with additional notes A. Bass, Chicago 1982, p. 63.
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Instead of thinking about time in this manner we should rather think about it 
in terms of temporalization – the manner in which time happens, the manner 
in which time is produced or given. It should be stressed that temporalization 
as a “production” of time should be contrasted with time flow which may be 
understood only as a derivation of temporalization, as common time. This 
could even be drawn from Husserl’s analysis of time, but is also well-proved 
by Heidegger’s distinction, and analysis, of the authentic and inauthentic time 
of Dasein (perhaps it is a kind of Heideggerian subjectivity) which we find 
in Sein und Zeit. Inauthentic time, briefly put, is a time of ontic relations, but 
its basis, as it were, is authentic time, i.e. primal, ecstatic temporalization as 
a free oscillation of its three dimensions – ecstasies, which are accordingly 
quite different from the three directions of common time.
To merely outline here this complex range of problems: the term “ecstasy” 
is derived by Heidegger from the Greek ekstasis, meaning “standing beyond, 
outside”. Heidegger, in his description of ecstasies also uses alternatively the 
rather ambiguous German term Entrückung, which literally means “pushing 
away”, “removing”, but also “release”. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger claims 
that ecstasies have their “where to” (Wohin). The “where to” (Wohin) of every 
ecstasy he terms its horizontal scheme. The future, the having been, and the 
present as ecstasies give Dasein the dynamics of ‘“toward itself,” “back to,” 
and “letting something be encountered”’, respectively.4 Let us look especially 
at the characteristics of the latter ecstasy.
Such an understanding of ecstatic temporality with the primary role of 
the future allows Heidegger to claim in Sein und Zeit that the “having been” 
stems “in a way” from the future, namely in the sense that it is the future that, 
by “releasing the present”, becomes the past.5 Also temporality itself as ‘the 
primary “beyond itself” in itself and for itself’ possesses a certain horizon.6 
The structure of the temporality of Dasein is thus characterised by ecstaticity 
and horizontality, while temporality itself temporalizes (zeitigt) itself. To sum 
up, according to Heidegger:
1. The essence of time is of an ecstatic character.
2. The ecstatic structure of time is characterised by horizontality.
3. Time does not pass, nor does it remain, but it temporalizes itself. Tempo-
ralizing is a primal phenomenon (Urphänomen) of “motion” (Bewegung).
4 M. Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. J. Stambaugh, 
Albany 1996, p. 302.
5 Ibidem, p. 300.
6 Ibidem, p. 461.
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4. Time is not connected with sensibility but is more primary than sensi-
bility, mind, or intellect. Heidegger stresses that by intellect here he means 
finite intellect.
5. Time, which constitutes the continuity of Dasein, cannot be grasped, 
if Dasein is reduced to such theoretical frameworks as ‘psychical whole, 
cognitive-volitional subject, self-awareness, or as the unity of body, soul, 
and mind’.7
Heidegger states in Sein und Zeit: ‘Temporality “is” not a being at all. It is 
not, but rather temporalizes itself.’8 He calls the temporalizing of that tempo-
rality the primary, source, time. According to Heidegger it is the ecstatic tem-
porality that is the condition of Dasein’s existence, along with its “here” (Da). 
Ecstatic temporality clears (lichtet) the “here.”9 It is only that clearing (Geli-
chtetheit) that makes every illumination and elucidation (Erleuchtung und Er-
hellung), every perception, “seeing” and the possession of anything, possible.10
As we read in Sein und Zeit: ‘“Time” is neither objectively present in the 
“subject” nor in the “object”, neither “inside” nor “outside”; and it “is” “prior” 
to every subjectivity and objectivity, because it presents the condition of the 
very possibility of this “prior”’.11
Heidegger’s reflections on temporality in Sein und Zeit reach a point where 
he isolates the proper temporality of Dasein. This turns out to be the forerun-
ning-repeated moment (der vorlaufend-wiederholende Augenblick), the proper 
present (Gegen-wart, literally towards-waiting, waiting for what comes from 
ahead) that ‘lets what it discovers at hand and objectively present be encoun-
tered in time.’12 Heidegger emphasises that the term “moment” has to be un-
derstood in the active sense, as ecstasy, and that is why it cannot be made clear 
in terms of the “now”, being a temporal phenomenon belonging to intra-tem-
porality: ‘the time “in which” objectively present things come into being and 
pass away’.13 In that sense, the moment, strictly speaking, is not a time-related 
term. Nothing can occur within a moment, claims Heidegger. In a moment, 
there would take place a unification of the three ecstasies of temporality in their 
proper modi, and Dasein would “become” an outspread, ecstatic continuity.
7 See: idem, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (Studies in Phenomenology and 
Existential Philosophy), trans. M. Heim, Bloomington 1984, p. 198.
8 Idem, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, op. cit., p. 302.
9 Ibidem, p. 321.
10 Ibidem, p. 321.
11 Ibidem, p. 384–385.
12 Ibidem, p. 306.
13 Ibidem.
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FOUR-DIMENSIONAL TIME AS THE ULTIMATE  
DIMENSION OF TIME
Time and Being (1962) is considered to be the ultimate discussion of the 
question of temporality by Heidegger, although passages concerning tempor- 
ality can also be found in the earlier Contributions to Philosophy. The having 
been, the present and the future, characterised by Heidegger as con-temporary 
(Gleich-zeitige), interpenetrate, yield to one another (Sich-einander Reichen), 
and with them time-space (Zeit-Raum) clears itself (lichtet-sich). Temporaliz-
ing in the unity of that contemporaneity, time spaces (einräumt) time-space. 
Time itself, primal time, in the fullness of its nature, does not move, rests inert 
in the Open (Offene), the matrix of all relations.14 Speaking of the unity of 
those three dimensions, Heidegger calls it the fourth dimension of time.
According to Heidegger, the ecstatic unity of the horizon of temporality 
would be a temporal condition for the possibility of the world, the possibility 
of the appearance of phenomena. At the same time, that process would be, 
according to Heidegger, the nullifying of nothingness (Nichts nichtet) (this 
expression was famously criticised by Carnap). During the seminar in Le 
Thor (1969), Heidegger would say that nothingness is a characteristic of be-
ing (Sein), which would be recorded in the following way: ‘Being : Nothing 
: The Same.’15 The world, then, is not nothingness in the sense of absence, 
the absence of nothing: the world is nothingness as temporalizing temporal-
ity. In that sense, nothingness would be of a founding character with respect 
to it. That is why Heidegger terms that nothingness nihil originarium, and its 
proper temporalization would be the primary phenomenon (Urphänomen) of 
motion (Bewegung), motion inseparable from the appearance of phenomena. 
In connection with this motion, Heidegger talks about vibration, corrugation 
(Erzittern), inexhaustible oscillation (Schwingung) of enowning (Ereignis), 
which would radiate within the Open and permeate it (durchragen).16
In Dzogchen, the ultimate dimension is described as the primordially clear 
(ka dag) basis (gzhi), including three aspects: essence (ngo bo) or emptiness 
(stong nyid), nature (rang bzhin) or clarity (gsal ba), and energy or potenti-
ality (thugs rje). The name for that primary state in Dzogchen teachings, is 
14 Idem, On the Way to Language, trans. P. D. Hertz, New York 1971, p. 106.
15 Idem, Four Seminars: Le Thor 1966, 1968, 1969, Zähringen 1973, trans. A. Mitch-
ell, F. Raffoul, Bloomington & Indianapolis 2003, p. 58.
16 Idem, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. P. Emad, K. Maly, 
Bloomington & Indianapolis 1999, p. 262.
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Samantabhadra or Kuntu Zangpo, the Primeval Buddha. Thus, in Dharma-
dhatu’s Treasury (Chos dbying rin po che’i mdzod ces bya ba) of Longchen-
pa, we can read that everything that emerges, or arises, within the expanse of 
spontaneity/self-perfection (lhun grub klong), which is an empty, clear basis 
(gzhi) of everything, a never-existing basis, though manifest in everything, 
from it originate samsara and nirvana, never, however, inseparable from it.17 
That primeval, unborn spontaneity is at the same time nothing other than the 
characteristic of clarity of the mind (sems nyid), luminous in its nature (rang 
bzhin); that is why samsara and nirvana are essentially nothing other than the 
mentioned mind, which has no beginning, middle, or end, in the temporal, as 
well as in the spatial, sense – it transcends time and space, cause and effect, 
the extremes of nihilism and eternalism, all concepts, and is like a cloud-
less sky. It is the natural, true, state of all beings, the Primeval Buddha, and 
lights, rays, and thigles, would be the most subtle dimension, the inner clarity 
(nang gsal) of its constant, unrestrained manifestation. A failure to recognise 
that state, an occurrence of ignorance as the source of samsara, launches, as 
it were, the flow of the conventionally understood time, which, in essence, 
would anyway only be a manifestation of Kuntu Zangpo time that is non-tem-
poral in its nature.
That is, very briefly, what the understanding of the ultimate dimension in 
Dzogchen teachings – termed variously as Primeval Buddha, Samantabhadra, 
Kuntu, and Zangpo18 – would have to be. This understanding also has an as-
pect that is closely linked to the problem of time that interests us here. As ex-
plained by Longchenpa, “The three times and timeless time is Kuntu Zangpo 
time, and it is the originally accomplished and changeless state.”19
Generally speaking, Longchenpa distinguishes four times (dus bzhi): the 
past, the present, the future and the fourth time (dus bzhi pa).20 His under-
standing of the first three is conventional in principle, although he stresses 
the non-existence of time as such, because for him not only do the past and 
the future not exist, but the present as well, and here he seems to be follow-
ing the analyses of Nāgārjuna’s: “Past – it has ceased; future – it has not 
yet come into existence; Present – it does not linger. It is neither within nor 
17 See: Longchen Rabjam, The Precious Treasury of the Basic Space of Phenomena, 
trans. R. Barron, Juncton City 2001, pp. 3–5.
18 Namkhai Norbu, The Crystal and the Way of Light. Sutra, Tantra and Dzogchen, 
Ithaca 2000.
19 Tulku Thondup Rinpoche, Buddha Mind. An Anthology of Longchen Rabjam’s Writ-
ings on Dzogpa Czenpo, Ithaca 1989, p. 347.
20 Ibidem.
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without nor anywhere. Know it to be like the sky and immune to proposi-
tions about it.”21
Here again we find the familiar metaphor of the sky as a metaphor of the 
primordial state. That state, according to Longchenpa, transcends all terms 
that might apply to it. The fourth time is the timeless time (dus med), or no-
time, in the sense of the atemporal expression, original ground (gdod ma’i 
gzhi). That ground is entirely free from any determinants of the conventionally 
understood three times. Longchenpa himself states that in the passage quoted 
by Zhinhua Yao in his article22:
This self-existing pristine cognitiveness, (evoked through) Guru’s sustaining power,
Is seen when words and thoughts and talk have passed away,
To see it then as time
Is (the moment) when the three aspects of time are no-time, and a “before” or a “later” 
can no longer be distinguished.
It is called Prajnaparamita, Madhyamika,
Zhi-byed, calming (the rush of) propositions and suffering, Mahamudra,
rDzogs-chen, the very meaningfulness of meaningfulness.
Quoting this text of Longchenpa on time, Zhinhua Yao states: “Here Long-
chenpa does not show us in detail how three times are no-time.”23 Perhaps 
Longchenpa is not very outspoken as to how the three times are no-time, but 
there might be fundamental reasons for that which Zhinhua Yao seems to 
be unaware – namely that the experience of no-time is one that cancels the 
common experience of time. It is an extra-conceptual experience, unspoken 
in language, which Longchenpa identifies with realisation of the nature of the 
mind, mentioning the various names it has been given in different schools of 
Buddhism.
Similarly, while quoting Namkhai Norbu’s remarks on primary presence, 
he asks: “Then how is this true state, which is beyond the past, present, and 
future, related to time? Is it totally different from the time, or only another 
dimension of time? Namkhai Norbu does not state this clearly.”24 
21 Longchenpa (Klong-chen rab-‘byams-pa), Kindly Bent to Easy Us: From the Trilogy 
of Finding Comfort and Ease (Ngal-gso-skor-gsum), 3 vols, trans. from the Tibetan and 
annotated by H. V. Guenther, Emeryville 1975–1976, vol. I, p. 196. 
22 Idem, Kindly Bent to Easy Us: From the Trilogy of Finding Comfort and Ease 
(Ngal-gso-skor-gsum), 3 vols, trans. from the Tibetan and annotated by H. V. Guenther, 
Emeryville 1975–1976, vol. 2, pp. 88–89.
23 Zhinhua Yao, op. cit., p. 517.
24 Ibidem, p. 515.
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The problem is, such an explanation of the relationship between the Kuntu 
Zangpo time and the common time probably isn’t possible at all, as it is impos-
sible to explain the primordial state. It is perhaps possible to point to it, using 
for example symbols or metaphors, as with the sky or the mirror metaphors. 
Since, as explained by Longchenpa:25 
The nature of all samsara and nirvana is this luminous mind,
Unmanifest, unproduced, indeterminate spontaneity,
Coming from nowhere and going nowhere;
The matrix of luminous mind indicates neither past nor future,
For it is unvarying in its all-pervasive uniformity.
Reality, just as it is, without beginning, middle or end,
An all-pervasive smoothness, is skylike in nature;
Without either beginning or end, it supersedes linear time.
This luminous mind as the nature of all samsara and nirvana is self-exist-
ing, timeless cognitiveness, which is expressed by the Tibetan term, ye shes. As 
pointed out by Keith Dowman, the particle ye is often translated as “timeless”, 
and then the whole expression could be translated as “timeless awareness”, 
which yet opens up a possibility of reification through the identification of 
the timeless with that which is primordial, or original (ye nas) in the sense of 
having existed since forever, or from some beginning.26 Since ye is at the same 
time an onomatopoeic evocation of the now, ye shes can also be understood as 
“awareness in the now”, the experiencing of which is often rendered through 
the Tibetan term rig pa. It has been variously translated as “pure essence,” “in-
stant presence,” “inner awareness,” “empty cognition,” “gnosis”, which might 
be the result of an unusual convergence of epistemology, ontology, and tempo-
rality, sedimented, as it were, in its rich semantic scope. Despite this semantic 
richness that convergence seems to be an unavoidable aporia. An aporia usu-
ally appears when we are trying to express in language the unutterable, when 
we arrive at the limit of what can be uttered in it. Atemporal “awareness in the 
now” is an aporia, as is the previously quoted statement of Longchenpa’s: “The 
three times and timeless time is Kuntu Zangpo time, and it is the originally 
accomplished and changeless state.” The atemporal continuity of a primordial 
state is an aporia, as is stating that the fourth time is no-time. The aporia of 
25 Spaciousness: The Radical Dzogchen of the Vajra-Heart. Longchenpa’s Treasury 
of the Dharmadatu, trans. from the Tibetan and Commentary by K. Dowman, Katmandhu 
2013, pp. 11–12.
26 See: ibidem, p. 110.
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the uttering of the primordial state cannot be removed, it can only be bypassed 
through a metaphor, but it Zhinhua Yao seems to be ignoring such a state of 
affairs. This is probably why he maintains that “Dzogchen brought together 
time and the timeless, allowing the timeless to penetrate into time.”27 Is this not 
saying too much, however? For that “timeless” should be understood in terms 
of a non-dual pristine awareness which is devoid of conventions of common 
three times. This pristine awareness is only perceptible by direct experience and 
hence is not a subject of conceptual thought. Such non-dual awareness, which 
may be termed ‘fourth time,’ could be regarded as absolute and beyond the 
conventionality of three times, as pure immanence which is extraneously empty 
of all the impure phenomena associated with cyclic existence. Even if this 
view has been the focus of extensive debate in Buddhism over the centuries, it 
seems that Longchenpa, who was the eminent Dzogchen master and adept of 
the Nyingmapa School, could not have disagreed with it.28
Discussing Heidegger’s views on time, Zhinhua Yao fails to mention the 
ecstatic character of temporality, thus essentially imputing to Heidegger the 
use of the common notion of time. It seems, however, that the confinement 
to the common, metaphysical, understanding of time shuts him off, not only 
from the proper understanding of what Heidegger tries to say about time, but 
makes it impossible for him to interpret the Dzogchen definition of time. If 
the four-dimensional time appears to be non-temporal in the common under-
standing of time, one may still say it would be the potentiality, the vibration 
of the Open as the ultimate dimension. If there are analogies between Heideg-
ger’s views on time and the understanding of time in Longchenpa (or, broadly 
speaking, Dzogchen), they would stem rather from a similar, non-metaphys-
ical, energetic, understanding of the ultimate dimension as the pure imma-
nence, than from the fourfold, mandalic, structure of the mind, as Zhinhua Yao 
suggests. It seems that in using the fourth time concept that is close in formula-
tion to Heidegger’s, Longchenpa departs from the metaphysical understanding 
of time, yet Zhinhua Yao, adhering mostly to the common understanding of 
time, cannot arrive at that interpretation. 
The above remarks do not, of course, mean that the task is an easy one. 
On the contrary – the problem of time, or temporality, counts among the most 
complicated, also, if not only, for the fact that any formulation of time would 
essentially be an attempt to utter the unutterable. If the four-dimensional time 
27 Ibidem, p. 518.
28 See: Dudjom Rinpoche, The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism. Its Fundamen-
tals and History, trans. and edited by G. Dorje and M. Kapstein, Boston 1991.
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as no-time is not a being of any kind, how then are we supposed to understand 
it or talk about it? What would it be? Pure immanence beyond language? No 
doubt, we have strayed rather far here from the common understanding of 
time, with its evanescence, its passing of moment after moment. Even more: 
that time seems to vanish, as it were, when we try to think its source.
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